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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how people think about aiding others in a way that can 
inform both theory and practice. It uses data gathered from Kiva, an online, 
non-profit organization that allows individuals to aid other individuals 
around the world, to isolate intuitions that people find broadly compelling. 
The central result of the paper is that people seem to give more priority 
to aiding those in greater need, at least below some threshold. That is, the 
data strongly suggest incorporating both a threshold and a prioritarian 
principle into the analysis of what principles for aid distribution people 
accept. This conclusion should be of broad interest to aid practitioners 
and policy makers. It may also provide important information for political 
philosophers interested in building, justifying, and criticizing theories about 
meeting needs using empirical evidence.
1. Introduction
Suppose you had to choose how to lend $500 dollars. Would you lend all $500 to a woman in Costa 
Rica for capital to expand her clothing shop? Would you divide it up equally between a man in Uganda 
to buy an ox for his farm and a woman in Bolivia to buy textbooks for school?
This paper tries to determine how people think about aiding others in a way that can inform both 
theory and practice. It uses data gathered from Kiva, an online, non-profit organization that allows 
individuals to aid other individuals, to isolate intuitions that people find broadly compelling. Although 
Kiva lenders are technically giving loans, the paper takes them to be offering aid because the loans 
do not bear interest (and are uninsured). This is in line with definitions of aid from international 
institutions (World Bank Group, 2016). Nevertheless, readers are welcome to substitute a different 
term throughout since the distinction between loans and other kinds of aid is not what is of interest 
here. Different norms may be associated with lending money and aiding people in other ways. This 
is especially likely if Kiva lenders are concerned about getting their money back. So further research 
on this topic is pressing and important.
This paper also attempts to stay neutral on what people are responding to in aiding others (e.g., 
lack of resources, opportunities, welfare). To do this, it will use the term ‘need’ to capture whatever it 
is that people below some threshold lack.1 It will refer to whatever alleviates need or brings someone 
higher above the threshold as ‘aid’. Material goods and utility may be aid in this sense. Alternatively, 
opportunities might be necessary to alleviate need (Miller, 1999).2 Moreover, the paper tries to stay 
neutral on the appropriate level of the threshold, though it supposes that those seeking loans are 
below this threshold.
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This paper has several results. The central result of the paper is that lenders seem to give more 
priority to aiding those in greater need, at least below some threshold. This might not strike some 
readers as particularly surprising, but consider that people might have chosen to minimize need 
without considering its distribution or preferred only to help some below a given threshold but not 
to give priority to helping those who initially had greater need. Alternatively, it could have been the 
case that people did not just give more priority to helping those below some threshold; people could 
have also given priority to helping those with greater needs at all levels. Political philosophers have 
argued for several competing principles for aiding the poor, and it is interesting to see what principles 
most people actually accept (Miller, 1999).
This paper’s results are important for many projects. They can be used to build, justify, and criticize 
philosophical theories about how people think about meeting need (Brock, 1998). After all, some 
political philosophers, like David Miller (1999), argue at length that social science and theoretical 
inquiry are necessarily interdependent. Miller argues that while reflective equilibrium is often nar-
rowly construed as within an individual, it ought to be expanded to include the considered judgments 
between individuals. He suggests that
Looking at what other people believe about justice, and in particular trying to understand when people disagree 
and what the grounds of their disagreement are, are integral to the process of deciding which of [one’s] … own 
beliefs deserve to be taken as ‘the fixed points’. (Miller, 1999, p. 56)
Expanding reflective equilibrium to include considered judgments between individuals is particularly 
important when the beliefs in question are controversial. As Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner 
argue, there is reason to worry about
standard philosophical methodology, whereby philosophers consult their own intuitions from the armchair and 
assume that they represent ordinary intuitions. While this practice may be appropriate when such an assumption 
is uncontroversial … philosophers have conflicting intuitions, intuitions that may well have been influenced by 
their own well-developed theories. (2006, p. 85)
Consider Derek Parfit’s discussion of a case by Thomas Nagel: Nagel imagines that he has two children, 
one healthy and happy, the other suffering from some painful handicap. Nagel’s family could either 
move to a city where the second could receive special treatment or move to a suburb where the first 
child would flourish (Parfit, 1997). However, there is disagreement about whether the greater benefit 
to the first child outweighs the greater needs of the second child. Folk intuitions may help arbitrate 
these disagreements. At least when political philosophers disagree about controversial intuitions and 
are attempting to explicate the core commitments of common sense morality, appealing to the beliefs 
of ordinary people might shift the burden of proof onto those who would deny more widely shared 
intuitions. This paper’s results can be interpreted as providing evidence about the beliefs of ordinary 
people.
Although this paper’s conclusions are primarily descriptive (not normative), its results may help 
arbitrate some debates about which principles for distributing aid to those in need are correct. In 
Principles of Social Justice, for instance, Miller relies on evidence about what people believe to argue 
against the view that we should be indifferent between distributions that simply minimize the amount 
of need in a situation and those that give strict priority to aiding more needy people at all levels. On the 
other hand, Gillian Brock (2005) uses such evidence to suggest that people believe it is more important 
to meet the needs of those below some threshold than those above that threshold.3 If we can draw on 
evidence about what people believe in arguing about what justice requires, this paper’s conclusions 
might buttress some of the theories about how we should meet needs over others.
This paper will proceed as follows. The next section discusses the data Kiva provides. It then sets 
out several principles for distributing aid according to need. Section 4 presents empirical evidence 
that people favor some of these principles over others. Section 5 responds to objections to this paper’s 
conclusion that, when making decisions about aiding those in need, Kiva lenders are more concerned 
about aiding those in countries that are less well off, at least below some income threshold. Finally, 
this paper considers the theoretical and practical importance of its conclusions.
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2. Kiva data and question for analysis
Kiva is a non-profit microfinance organization that allows people to lend small amounts of money 
to people in need. Microfinance is the umbrella term for providing small-scale financial services to 
those without traditional access to such services.4 Often this takes the form of micro-loans of as little 
as several hundred dollars.
Kiva lenders do not just donate a sum of money to Kiva to be distributed at Kiva’s discretion. 
Instead, lenders browse the website and choose to lend to a particular individual.5 The lender does 
not receive any interest payments and assumes the risk of default, so the loan is not an investment 
opportunity. Users can search by region, country, gender, purpose, popularity, and how close the loan 
is to being fully funded.
Once a specific loan is selected, there is a variety of information available to the potential lender. There 
is a photo of the individual (or group), a brief biography written by a volunteer for Kiva, and description 
of the purpose and funding status of the micro-loan. Information about the country of the borrower 
is available: the average annual income (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)), the currency, 
and the exchange rate. Further information is available, but it requires clicking some hyperlinks and 
actively seeking it out. The lenders represented in this dataset are of a wide community, and, assuming 
their actions are connected with their beliefs, data about their actions will provide some information 
about what people believe.6 Because of Kiva’s success and willingness to share its data online, there is a 
large and interesting data set of over 30,000 loans available to be analyzed (from April 2006 to February 
2008).7 The lenders come from nearly 200 countries and are of various ages and socio-economic statuses.8
This paper uses Kiva data to consider how people think about distributing aid to people in need, 
though doing so requires several (potentially controversial) assumptions. First, the paper assumes that 
the amount of time it takes for a loan to get funded on Kiva, ceteris paribus, is a reasonable proxy for 
the level of priority people place on distributing aid to that individual.9 So if people care more about 
helping someone in Belize than helping someone in Mexico, then (other things being equal) the 
loan to a person in Belize will be funded more quickly. Second, the paper assumes that the per capita 
income of the borrower’s country is a reasonable proxy for how much that individual needs.10 That is, 
this paper assumes there is some connection between how much money people have (on average) in 
a country and how much most Kiva borrowers in that country need. This is compatible with the fact 
that some people need things that money cannot buy and some have unmet needs despite having a 
lot of money.11 The paper’s aim, then, is to determine which of several principles for distributing aid 
to those in need (if any) people might accept.
3. Principles for distributing aid
A principle governing the distribution of aid to those in need (henceforth, “a principle for distributing 
aid”) is neither a comprehensive ethical theory nor a theory of how political institutions should act.12 
A principle for distributing aid is instead, ceteris paribus, an account of how individuals should aid 
those in need. What follows will focus exclusively on principles for distributing aid.
The first principle for distributing aid this paper considers, distribution insensitivity, serves as its 
null hypothesis. When people are distribution insensitive, they are no more likely to give to those in 
greater need than to those in less need (see figure 1). The paper assumes that people are distribution 
insensitive when there is no relationship between funding time and per capita income. If this hypothesis 
can be rejected, there is some relationship between the variables of interest.
The second principle this paper considers is a prioritarian principle for distributing aid. This is 
really a category of principles. Those who accept a prioritarian principle for distributing aid will give 
preference to aiding people with greater need over aiding those with less need (Parfit, 1997; see also 
Hassoun, 2009). The moral value of providing a unit of aid to a person in need is greater the more that 
person needs it. The value of aiding a person at any given level of need is determined by a prioritarian 
weighting function. Figure 2 illustrates one prioritarian principle derived from one such function.13
1032  N. HassouN ET aL.
This figure shows that it is better to provide a unit of aid to a person with, say, 1 unit of resources, 
capabilities, welfare, or whatnot than to a person with 4 units. The moral value (priority) of aiding is 
higher in the former instance where the need is greater. (Giving a single unit of aid to someone with 1 
rather than 4 units generates 3 versus 1.5 units of moral value in the figure above.) It is also preferable 
to aid an individual with 4 units of resources over the one with, say, 6 units. (Giving a single unit of 
aid to someone with 4 rather than 6 units generates 1.5 versus 1.25 units of moral value.)
We group the third category of principles under consideration as threshold principles for distributing 
aid. Like prioritarian principles for distributing aid, there are many possible threshold principles (with 
thresholds at different levels).14 We take as the central claim of a threshold principle for distributing aid 
that it is appropriate to give preference to those below some threshold and that one should treat those 
below that threshold equally and those above that threshold equally.15 The graphical representation 
of one such threshold principle is given in figure 3.
Here the threshold is at 4 units of resources. So aiding someone with 3 units has higher moral value 
and thus greater priority than aiding someone with 5 units. (Giving a single unit of aid to someone with 
3 rather than 5 units generates 2.5 versus 1.5 units of moral value in the figure above.) Aiding someone 
with 1 unit would not, however, have priority over aiding someone who had 3 units. Similarly, aiding 
someone with 5 units would have no priority over aiding someone with 10 units. The motivating idea 
behind the threshold principle is that once people have enough, it is no longer appropriate to give 
preference to aiding those who have fewer resources.
The final category of principles this paper considers might be called p-threshold principles for 
distributing aid. P-threshold principles combine elements of prioritarian principles for distributing 
Figure 1. graphical representation of distribution insensitivity.
Figure 2. graphical representation of prioritarian principle.
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aid below some threshold of resources with a commitment to treating all those above some threshold 
equally. On p-threshold principles for distributing aid, it is more important to aid those people who 
have fewer resources below a threshold. Aiding people who have virtually nothing may be more 
important than aiding those who are struggling but still getting by, for instance, even though it is 
equally important to aid those above the threshold. Like prioritarian and threshold principles for dis-
tributing aid, there are many possible p-threshold principles. They all include a prioritarian weighting 
function up until some threshold after which people are treated equally. See figure 4 for a graphical 
representation of a p-threshold principle, where the threshold is arbitrarily (for illustration purposes) 
assumed to be 5 units of resources.
Here giving a single unit of aid to someone who has only 1 unit of resources is better than giving it 
to someone who has 5 units of resources. (The former action yields 3 units of moral value as opposed 
to 1.4 units of moral value.) However, it is not better to help someone who has 5 units of resources as 
opposed to 10 units. (Both actions yield 1.4 units of moral value.)
4. Empirical results
This section presents the results of three regressions and explains the empirical strategy we employ in 
the regression analysis. Regression analysis is used to estimate the relationship between two or more 
variables—here, funding time and per capita income.16 The regression looks at how the independent 
variable (per capita income) influences the dependent variable of interest (funding time), holding all 
other determinants of the latter constant. As noted in section 2, we think of the loan funding time as a 
Figure 3. graphical representation of threshold principle.
Figure 4. graphical representation of p-threshold principle.
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reasonable proxy for the level of priority people place on distributing aid to those in need. We take the 
per capita income of a borrower’s country as a proxy for the degree of a borrower’s need. Using regression 
analysis, we attempt to investigate the nature of the relationship between these two factors (provided 
there is any) and then reconcile the results with the predictions of the four principles for distributing aid 
outlined earlier in section 3. We believe the results of the analysis provide evidence regarding which prin-
ciples for distributing aid Kiva lenders accept. Technical details are relegated to notes and the appendix.
In examining how per capita income affects funding time for Kiva loans, we also control for other 
potential sources of variation in the loan funding time.17 In particular, we control for the log of the 
loan amount, the uses of the loan (retail, agriculture, services, etc.), a borrower’s gender, the year and 
the month the loan was funded, regional variables for Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and the United 
States, military involvement in a borrower’s country. Controlling for these characteristics of the loan 
allows us to identify the ceteris paribus effect (that is, the partial effect) of the per capita income on 
the loan funding time across all the loans. The rationale for including these controls is as follows. Loan 
size is an important variable to investigate. Everything being equal, a larger loan should take longer to 
fund. It is important to account for the uses of a loan since Kiva lenders might be biased toward funding 
certain types of loans. One might hypothesize that a lender may be more inclined to fund a loan that 
will be spent on purchasing a cow than to fund a loan for expanding a retail clothing store, for instance. 
Thus, one might expect the latter loan to take longer to get funded. Since microfinance is often targeted 
at women, it is important to account for any potential gender differential in how quickly the loan gets 
funded. Months were included to control for seasonal variation, particularly around December, and 
years were included to account for Kiva’s increasing popularity. It makes sense to compare June loans 
to June loans and not to December loans and likewise to compare loans made in 2008 to other loans in 
2008 rather than in 2006, when there was substantially less website traffic. These controls help ensure 
that the association between per capita income and funding time is not due to other factors.
We consider three different regression specifications for four different models (see the appendix for 
details). These are designed in an attempt to capture the relationship between the loan funding time 
and the per capita income in a way that will shed light on the underlying principle for distributing 
aid that people seem to follow (if any). However, to conserve space, we report the results for the last 
model only―this is the model, among the four, that best fits the data (see appendix). We now proceed 
to the regression results for this model under three different specifications.
4.1. Specification I
Since we do not have prior knowledge of the relationship between the loan funding time and the per 
capita income, we chose a simple specification to examine whether there is any statistically significant 
relation between the two variables. We thus start by setting the loan funding time to be a function of 
the income per capita (measured in thousands of PPP-adjusted U.S. dollars). We also include the set 
of controls listed in the beginning of this section. To account for the possibility that the relationship 
between the loan funding time and per capita income is not linear (i.e., cannot be depicted via a straight 
line), we also include the square of per capita income in the regression.18 This is a standard procedure 
for capturing potential non-linearities in the empirical literature.
The coefficient of the per capita income (jointly with its square term) is statistically significant at 
the 1% significance level (see the appendix for regression results), where the latter represents a rather 
small 1% probability of our mistakenly rejecting the true null hypothesis of a zero effect of the per 
capita income on the loan funding time. Hence, probabilistically we can be very confident that the 
per capita income has a non-zero effect on the loan funding time. This suggests that Kiva lenders 
are indeed distribution sensitive and that they do consider how much need a potential borrower has 
relative to others when making their decisions about funding loans. Figure 5 illustrates this.19 It tells 
us that, ceteris paribus, it takes almost half as much time for a borrower from a country with virtually 
zero income to get a loan funded as it would take for someone from a relatively rich country of $10,000 
per capita.20 To give a specific example, a borrower from Democratic Republic of Congo, the poorest 
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country in our sample ($119 per capita) is predicted to get a loan funded 1.94 times quicker than a 
borrower from Bulgaria, the second richest country in our sample ($10,840 per capita).
Figure 5 suggests two conclusions. First, people do seem to be distribution sensitive: had they 
not been, the loan funding time would not have changed with per capita income, and figure 5 would 
have plotted a straight horizontal line (as in figure 1). Second, there is some indication of a threshold 
beyond which Kiva lenders stop prioritizing loans to borrowers with greater need (as captured by the 
country’s income per capita). Starting at the income level of about $9,000 per capita, the borrower’s 
relative need seems to have virtually no effect on the loan funding time. They also seem to give priority 
to aiding those with greater need below this threshold. This is in line with the p-threshold principle 
for distributing aid: Kiva lenders act according to the prioritarian principle when distributing aid to 
relatively poor borrowers and are distribution insensitive above the approximately $9,000 per capita 
income threshold.21 Indeed, the relationship depicted in figure 5 falls into the family of p-threshold 
principles graphically presented in figure 4.
4.2. Specification II
One might worry that the shape of a graph above may be due to the chosen specification. In particu-
lar, recall that under Specification I we have included a square term of the per capita income in the 
regression, which may be the primary source of the apparent parabolic relationship that we observe 
in figure 5.
To address this potential problem, we break down the data into four income groups.22 After run-
ning the regression again, we find that the observed pattern still indicates that the Kiva lenders are 
distribution sensitive. However, it now suggests that a threshold, rather than p-threshold, principle 
governs people’s lending behavior (see figure 6).23 While figure 6 does produce a relationship like the 
one plotted in figure 3, it might seem that the results do not perfectly match the threshold principle. 
This is especially evident for the third and fourth income groups, which appear to be somewhat dif-
ferent from one another. This difference, however, is not statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level, leading us to conclude that there is no difference “with 99% confidence”.24 It is noteworthy that, 
although the two Specifications (I and II) lead to different conclusions, a simple statistical procedure 
tells us that the first specification fits the data best.25 Reflecting on the shapes of the graphs, however, 
it is not clear that either specification is the correct one.
4.3. Specification III
The shape of the graph in figure 6 suggests that it is worth considering a different specification of the 
regression which would allow for the apparent relationship between the per capita income and funding 
Figure 5. loan funding time ratio (specification i).
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time to come out more clearly.26 In particular, we next consider a specification that includes the cube 
and fifth-power of the per capita income in the regression.27
Under specification III, we get the results depicted in figure 7.28 First, the figure does not confirm 
a threshold principle as in the case of Specification II. Instead, the evidence yet again suggests prev-
alence of the p-threshold principle. Unlike under specification I, the plateau is now relatively longer, 
indicating a lower threshold (in terms of income) of around $7,000 per capita. This specification is 
also preferable to the two others based on statistical model selection procedures: it fits the data better 
than all other alternatives.29
The only caveat with this model is the anomalous downtick at the income of $11,000 per capita. 
There are two countries in that range of income in our sample: Mexico and Bulgaria. This unintuitive 
prediction of the estimated model warrants an explanation. First, the two countries are the richest in 
our sample. The next richest country is Ukraine, with an income of only $8,000 per capita. This may 
support treating both Mexico and Bulgaria as outliers in our sample and taking predictions for that 
range of income to be unreliable. Second, one can hypothesize that loans from Mexico and Bulgaria 
take longer to get funded than they should for some other (unknown) reason. Perhaps lenders, who 
are mostly from the United States, are biased against giving aid to Mexicans and believe that Bulgaria 
is richer than it is, so loans from these countries take more time to get funded. Controlling for both 
countries in the regression does not, however, eliminate the peculiar behavior of the predicted funding 
time for that income range. So we are more inclined to accept the first explanation—the two countries 
are outliers in our sample, especially given that the dataset contains a wide gap in the range of $8,000 
to $11,000 per capita. Thus, further research using a richer dataset is warranted.
Figure 6. loan funding time ratio (specification ii).
Figure 7. loan funding time ratio (specification iii).
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4.4. Summary of regression results
To conclude, the data show strong evidence that people indeed consider relative need when distrib-
uting aid. Distribution insensitivity is firmly rejected by all three specifications we consider in the 
paper. Moreover, the results also suggest that most lenders seem to accept a p-threshold principle for 
distributing aid. However, one needs to keep in mind that our results do not imply that every single 
Kiva lender follows a p-threshold principle; they rather indicate that lenders accept this principle on 
average. In fact, our sample may be a mix of different kinds of people: those who strictly follow either 
prioritarian principles or threshold principles and those who accept a combination of these princi-
ples, such as a p-threshold principle. The identification of principles for distributing aid relevant to 
every lender individually requires the use of more sophisticated statistical methods. We leave it for 
further research. Nevertheless, if one still has reservations about accepting our findings in favor of 
the p-threshold principle due to the issues discussed above, the data nevertheless strongly confirm 
incorporating both a threshold and a prioritarian principle into the analysis of what principles for aid 
distribution lenders accept (on average).
5. Objections and responses
There are many ways that our results might be biased. Consider, for instance, how our study is sensitive 
to the order in which the loans are posted.30 If people are more likely to fund loans that are posted 
earlier and Kiva gave priority to those most in need in posting loans, then that might make it seem 
like people care more for aiding the more needy than they actually do.
Because the Kiva data set is limited, it is impossible to test for all potential sources of bias here. 
There is, for instance, no information about a loan’s relative location on the website. Since, however, 
a quick look at the website suggests no obvious pattern for posting loans, and since lenders can also 
sort the loans in several different ways, this worry may not be very pressing. In the future, however, 
researchers might work with Kiva to secure more data and test for potential sources of bias. Mouse-
tracking technology may also help researchers secure information about what people are attending to 
in making loans. If someone discovers an actual source of bias in our study, this would provide good 
reason to reconsider our conclusions.
Table 1.  log-logistic regression. Reported are the estimates of the coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
robust standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, which is defined as the violation of the constant-variance assumption 
about the error term in the regression equation that results in incorrect estimates of standard errors if not accounted for. The results 
for control variables are omitted to conserve space, but available upon request.
*significant at the 1% level. 
**significant at the 5% level.
(I) (II) (III)
Per capita income of borrower’s country (in thousands of PPP-adjusted 
Us dollars)
0.138* 0.150*
(0.007) (0.010)
Per capita income ^2 −0.007*
(0.001)
Per capita income ^3 −0.002*
(0.000)
Per capita income ^5 (×10−3) 0.007*
(0.001)
Bottom quartile (by per capita income) −0.339*
(0.020)
second quartile −0.329*
(0.017)
Third quartile 0.011
(0.016)
No. of obs 33,186 33,186 33,186
log-likelihood −44,965.59 −44,999.78 −44,955.03
aic 90,003.17 90,073.56 89,984.06
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A different worry is that the regression results we report are subject to sample selection bias. People 
who use Kiva are significantly different from those who do not lend on Kiva. They are more likely 
to be conscientious about helping those in need than the average person. They are self-selected, or 
selected by someone they know if they are given a gift certificate. Therefore, the sample is unlikely 
to be representative of the population as a whole. Additionally, in order to register on the website, 
Kiva lenders must have access to the internet, which limits the sample to those of relatively higher 
socio-economic status.
While these sources of sample selection bias can potentially cause problems, looking at the data 
sample we have can, nevertheless, be very revealing, given the research question we posit. It might 
sometimes be appropriate to weight the intuitions of those who care about and are able to aid the 
needy more heavily than the intuitions of others. These people may, on average, be better educated, 
more compassionate, or may have spent more time reflecting on issues of need. In the same way that 
physicists may have more interesting and useful intuitions about cosmology, it is reasonable to hold 
that more reflective folk intuitions may be more informative for some purposes.31 There are, at least, 
many ways in which the Kiva sample is significantly larger and more diverse than almost any exist-
ing sample in experimental philosophy. It is not just a small sample of undergraduates’ intuitions. It 
contains data from a great number of lenders from almost every country in the world (many of these 
people received gift certificates and may not otherwise have navigated to the site). Although the sample 
is biased in some ways, requiring our conclusions to be appropriately qualified, it may not be biased 
in a problematic way.
A different worry is that lenders may not be thinking about principles for distributing aid when 
selecting which projects to fund. If so, it is unclear that their actions tell us anything about their under-
lying intuitions. One might suggest limiting the study to Kiva lenders who carefully consider the moral 
implications of their lending choices. The fact that some lenders are probably not thinking about how 
to meet need when giving loans on Kiva may not be problematic. It biases this study’s results towards 
showing no pattern, but we find clear patterns (assuming no unintentional bias). Second, people might 
follow a principle for distributing aid even if they do not consciously consider it when making their 
decisions. Third, there is, in any case, no way to restrict our sample to those who are trying to apply 
a principle for distributing aid. Finally, even if we could rely upon lenders who carefully consider the 
moral implications of their lending choices, it may still be unadvisable to do so since it would limit 
our data set and make it less representative.
In short, while there may be some concerns that this study has not been able to address, it nev-
ertheless provides some reason to believe that, on average, Kiva lenders are making loans that are 
consistent with a p-threshold principle for distributing aid.
6. Conclusion
This project has used empirical data to consider how people think about distributing aid. Specifically, 
we examined historical data in which people made decisions about distributing aid using their own 
money. This paper attempts to determine what principles for distributing aid people embrace. Its results 
suggest that Kiva lenders, in general, use a p-threshold principle.32 In any case, the data strongly reject 
the null hypothesis of distribution insensitivity.
This conclusion is important for theory and practice. It should be of broad interest to empirically 
informed political philosophers in making and arbitrating between theories (Miller, 1999). For political 
philosophers that give any weight to the common sense morality of ordinary people, this paper provides 
some evidence for what the common sense view is in regard to meeting needs. The evidence this paper 
provides is thus useful for building, justifying, and criticizing theories about meeting needs—we have 
seen, for instance, that it provides reason to reject distribution insensitivity and casts doubt on prior-
itarian and threshold principles.33 If these data help researchers build broadly compelling arguments 
for aiding the needy in some ways over others, it could also be pragmatically useful.
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Moreover, this paper’s results are important for other projects. Judith Lichtenberg (2004) argues, 
for instance, that in order to actually relieve poverty, it is important to understand human psychology. 
She thinks that it is necessary to bridge the gap between what people report that they believe and how 
they act. Toward this end, she asks, “What is the relationship between reason and motivation: does 
believing that one ought to do X entail that one is moved to do X?” (Lichtenberg, 2004, p. 75). There 
already exists some evidence about the former.34 This paper contributes evidence about the latter (also 
see Hassoun, 2009)
Finally, this paper suggests two avenues for future research, the first empirical and the second the-
oretical. Further empirical work might proceed by considering other proxies for need, including the 
number of poor people in each country, the proportion of poor people, literacy rates, infant mortality 
rates, life expectancy, or some weighted average of the above. The strong influence of U.S. military 
involvement on the funding time of loans suggests investigating other factors such as natural disasters, 
epidemics or political turmoil that influence how people perceive the needs of others. Further work 
could be done along these lines by using the earthquake in Haiti as a natural experiment. Using a 
more recent Kiva dataset would allow loans before the earthquake to be compared to those after the 
earthquake. The difference in the funding time would represent how Kiva lenders perceive the need 
of those who have suffered a natural disaster. Similar, more detailed investigations could be conducted 
on many countries for many reasons: the number of times poverty in a country is mentioned in the 
news media could be an interesting independent variable for further study, since it might be a reason-
able proxy for perception of need. Future theoretical research is necessary to explore all the ways this 
paper’s results can help arbitrate between theories about how we should distribute according to need. 
This study also encourages methodological reflection on which kinds of empirically based political 
theories are useful for establishing different hypotheses.
Appendix: Regression analysis
Since the funding time of the loan is a duration variable, the naturally applicable regression approach 
is the method of duration analysis designed to tackle transition data (this is also known as survival 
analysis in biological and biomedical applications or reliability analysis in engineering). In the case of 
Kiva lending data, the “transition” we observe is the process of a loan getting funded, in other words, 
transitioning from the unfunded to the funded state. The loan funding time constitutes the “duration” 
of the unfunded state. The reason we use special regression methods here is that funding time is a 
non-negative variable. That is, the time it takes to fund a loan will always be some positive amount of 
time. This makes traditional methods like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) unsuitable for this analysis: 
OLS hinges on the assumption that the variable on the left-hand side of a regression equation has a 
real codomain, so funding times would have to be both positive and negative.35
In particular, we estimate a hazard model, where “hazard” (or “hazard rate”) stands for the instanta-
neous probability of completing the transition from one state to the other, conditional on it remaining 
incomplete until this very instant.36 Applied to our particular study, the definition of the hazard rate 
would be the probability of getting the loan funded on, say, the tenth day, conditional on having it still 
unfunded by the tenth day. The regression models this probability as a function of the explanatory 
(independent) variables to identify how these variables affect the hazard.
While there are many ways of looking at the results produced by a hazard model, in our case it is 
most natural and intuitive to analyze the data by looking at the predicted total time until the loan is 
funded (compared to some reference group).37 Recall that the assumption is that the loan funding 
time indicates the priority given to loans by lenders. The paper seeks to investigate how these priorities 
change with the per capita income of a borrower’s country. Thus, all the conclusions are drawn based 
on the results reported in terms of the loan funding time.
In this paper we consider four parametric hazard models that are built upon different distributional 
assumptions about the duration variable (the loan funding time). That is, we consider whether the loan 
funding time follows exponential, Weibull, log-normal, or log-logistic distributions. We chose to look 
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at these four different distributions because they differ in the duration dependence (i.e., how hazard rate 
changes with the time) that each of them implies. In particular, while exponential distribution implies 
a constant hazard rate that does not change over time (no duration dependence), Weibull distribution 
can yield a hazard rate that can be either monotonically increasing (positive duration dependence) or 
monotonically decreasing over time (negative duration dependence). The hazard rate of a log-normally 
distributed variable is not monotonic: it first rises and then falls with the passage of time. Log-logistic 
distribution is, however, the most flexible of the four—it can imply either a monotonically decreasing 
hazard or one that behaves similarly to the hazard of the log-normal distribution (inverted U-shape). 
Since all of the models are non-linear in parameters,38 they are estimated via the Maximum Likelihood 
method, the underlying principle of which is, given the distributional assumption, to find values of 
the unknown parameters that will maximize the probability of observing the actual sample data. The 
latter is done by maximizing the log-likelihood function (the joint probability function for the sample) 
in the unknown parameters.39
Considering such a wide range of hazard models is warranted by the fact that we lack a priori 
knowledge of the nature of duration dependence—none of the proposed principles for distributing 
aid tells us what to expect about the behavior of the hazard rate over time. We thus prefer that the data 
tell us which of the models fits the data best.
Discriminating between the exponential and Weibull models is fairly simple. The comparison of 
the two models boils down to a test of the hypothesis that the Weibull shape parameter is equal to 
unity.40 The exponential model is thus rejected in favor of the Weibull model if the shape parameter 
is statistically significantly different from unity. In order to compare the remaining three models 
(Weibull, log-normal, and log-logistic) a common approach is to use the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), a measure of the relative goodness of fit of the model. The idea behind any goodness-of-fit 
measure is to see how well a model matches the data. One of the ways to measure fit is in terms of the 
maximized value of the log-likelihood function, that is, the log-likelihood function evaluated at the 
parameter estimates obtained by maximizing the former. In this case, the higher the maximized value 
is, the more likely one is to observe the data sample, and the better the data fits the model. However, 
the less parsimonious models, those with more parameters, tend to fit data better, which nevertheless 
comes at the expense of a loss of degrees of freedom.41 The AIC accounts for this tradeoff: it penalizes 
adding extra parameters to a model and only counts them as an improvement if the increase in fit is 
sufficient to overcome the loss of parsimony. The model with the lowest AIC is standardly considered 
the best among given alternatives.
 We test three different regression specifications (described in the main body of the paper) for each 
of these four hazard models. However, to conserve space, this paper reports the results for log-logistic 
model only—this is the model, among the four, that best fits the data. Under each of the three regres-
sion specifications, the exponential hazard model is rejected in favor of the Weibull model at the 
conventional 5% significance level. However, based on the AIC criterion, it is the log-logistic model 
that beats the two other alternatives (Weibull and log-normal) under all three regression specifications. 
See Table 1 for the output of the log-logistic model.42
Notes
1.  On the proper basis for poverty measurement, see Nussbaum (2000), Pogge (2004), and Sen (1997). On different 
philosophical conceptions of basic needs, see Braybrooke (1987) and Brock (1998).
2.  Talk about needs and aid does not presuppose that any particular way of distributing aid (in the relevant broad 
sense) is best. It might, for instance, alleviate just as much need to give 10 children a year of schooling as to 
inoculate a single child against measles.
3.  Brock (1998) is committed to the relevance of empirical evidence about ordinary individuals’ intuitions.
4.  This does not mean that users of microfinance do not have access to credit, in fact they often do have access to 
credit, but it is often either extremely expensive, unreliable, or both (Rosenberg, 2010).
5.  Note that as Kiva scaled up in size, it began dispersing loans before they were funded on the site, creating a 
significant controversy. For more information, see Ogden (2009).
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6.  Despite being widely representative in this way, there are some important ways in which the sample may be 
biased. Access to the internet may bias the selection according to socio-economic status, and the lenders are 
self-selected.
7.  We are grateful to Joseph Ramsey for assistance in gathering the data.
8.  Currently, 196 countries are represented by Kiva lenders. This is likely a marked increase from the older snapshot 
of data considered here, but even this older sample contains a globally diverse set of lenders. The majority, 
however, are from the United States. The lenders include everyone from students to software engineers to 
retired people.
9.  The purpose of the ceteris paribus clause is to prevent a simplistic interpretation of how quickly a loan gets 
funded. For example, it might be objected that obviously bigger loans will take longer to fund, but by controlling 
for the size on the loan in the regression specification, this worry is mitigated. It is also worth noting that virtually 
all loans on Kiva eventually get funded, so comparing which loans get funded is not productive.
10.  Country incomes are adjusted for purchasing power parity to capture the currencies’ purchasing power. PPP 
measures attempt to equalize rates of currency conversion by accounting for different price levels across 
countries. One Euro may be worth 1.4 US Dollars, but if goods cost less in the United States, then the purchasing 
power of the dollar may be higher than the currency exchange rate would suggest. For more information, see 
www.oecd.org/std/prices-ppp.
11.  This paper does not provide an analysis of what constitutes need. It assumes that it is reasonable to talk about 
how much people need in the absence of agreement on what exactly constitutes need. It also assumes that most 
people can usually recognize need when they see it and may be motivated to respond to need by providing aid.
12.  So, for instance, accepting a prioritarian principle for distributing aid (described below) may not commit one 
to a completely prioritarian theory of justice. On prioritarianism in other domains, see Parfit (1997).
13.  The weighting function must be strictly decreasing and strictly convex in well-being, resources, welfare or 
whatnot, as the one plotted in figure 2. For a detailed discussion of the prioritarian weighting and value functions, 
see Lumer (2005). Distinguishing a particular prioritarian weighting function is likely too great a task for this 
data set. However, it is possible to establish that people are accepting one of a class of prioritarian principles 
without knowing which particular one they accept. For a technical discussion, see Brown (2005).
14.  One possible basis for threshold principles is sufficientarianism. There is significant debate in the philosophical 
literature about the proper ground and limits of different principles for distributing aid, including sufficiency 
principles. See Crisp (2003a, 2003b) and Frankfurt (1987).
15.  Those who embrace sufficiency theories about what justice or morality requires do not have to embrace a 
threshold principle for distributing aid, though most will do so. Furthermore, committing to a threshold is not 
necessary for specifying the aim of their theory. They may believe that other principles will better contribute 
to achieving sufficiency (just like utilitarians might embrace prohibitions against murder or redistributing 
organs because they believe doing so will maximize utility). Consider, for instance, sufficiency theorists who 
only maintain that we should treat all those above some threshold of need equally. These sufficiency theorists 
can accept some kind of prioritarianism below the need threshold—what we will call a p-threshold principle 
for distributing aid. On sufficiency theories in ethics, see Frankfurt (1997).
16.  If t is funding time and y is per capita income, the basic form of the regression is a linear equation that specifies 
a linear relationship between t and y: t = 훽1 + 훽2y + 휖, where β’s are intercept and slope coefficients and ϵ is 
an identically and independently distributed random error. Provided that the above relationship is correctly 
specified (i.e., that it is indeed of linear form), using data on the loan funding time and per capita income, one 
can estimate both intercept and slope coefficients that are the sample estimates of the true (unknown) parameters. 
The estimation of the parameters is of interest for their valuable interpretation: in our particular case, if the 
borrower comes from the country whose per capita income is a thousand dollars greater, ceteris paribus, it will 
take β2 times 1,000 units of time longer (or less) to get her loan funded. Also, knowing the estimates of the 
parameters enables us to predict, on average, the loan funding time for any known per capita income. For a 
good introduction to regression analysis, see Wooldridge (2008).
17.  We control for those by including respective variables in the regression.
18.  A common example of a non-linear relationship is between earnings and age. While earnings always increase 
with age, the increase tends to be much larger for young ages than for ages close to retirement. Since a straight 
line cannot be drawn to indicate the relationship, it is a non-linear relationship. We also consider including the 
cube of the per capita income. The results are not qualitatively different from the ones presented in the paper.
19.  See the appendix for an explanation of the models. Note that following a convention in duration analysis, we 
calculate loan funding time ratios as a function of an explanatory variable of interest, namely per capita income 
in a borrower’s country. In particular, we estimate the predicted ratios of loan funding time for a borrower who 
comes from a country with zero per capita income (i.e., with the greatest need) over the funding time evaluated 
at a given per capita income. The choice of the “zero per capita income” reference is purely due to technical 
convenience. Any other reference point could have been chosen—the results would be qualitatively unchanged. 
In fact, a “zero per capita income” reference is quite sensible, given our data sample: the Democratic Republic 
of Congo’s per capita income is virtually zero ($119). Figure 5 plots these time ratios.
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20.  The time ratio, defined in the previous footnote, equals 0.5.
21.  Note that figure 5 plots a decreasing, convex curve up until the $9,000 threshold, which is consistent with 
the properties of the prioritarian weighting function discussed in footnote 13. The curve becomes a straight 
horizontal line here, consistent with threshold principles for distributing aid.
22.  This mitigates the potential “smoothing-out” effect of having the per capita income enter the regression as 
a continuous variable (as in Specification I). More precisely, we now let the loan funding time be a function 
of per capita income defined as a discrete variable. In particular, we construct indicator (dummy) variables 
corresponding to quartiles of the distribution of per capita income and let them enter the regression equation. 
Such indicator variables are usually defined for categorical (descriptive, non-numerical) variables such as gender 
and country. For instance, to control for gender effects in our regression analysis, we let the equation include 
the Gender dummy variable defined in the following fashion: Gender = 1 if a loan is asked for by a female, and 
= 0 otherwise. A regression with per capita income defined as a discrete variable, rather than as a continuous 
variable, is capable of capturing potential non-continuous jumps in the relationship between loan funding time 
and income (such as a jump in moral value in the case of a threshold principle, as depicted in figure 3). The 
latter would be impossible if one uses a continuous variable which will, by definition, smooth out a potentially 
discontinuous relationship.
23.  The figure reports the time ratios, where the bottom quartile is chosen to be a reference group (the choice of a 
reference group is arbitrary and does not change the results qualitatively). Of course, the relationship between 
per capita income and funding time is no longer represented by a smooth curve as when continuous variables 
were used under Specification I.
24.  The p-value of the Wald test of the two parameters being equal is 0.5081, leading us to accept the null.
25.  Based on the comparison of the AIC criteria explained in Appendix.
26.  The graph resembles “one minus” a generic cumulative distribution function. The cumulative distribution 
function describes the probability of a random variable X taking a value less than or equal to a particular value 
x, i.e., Pr [X ≤ x].
27.  This is inspired by a polynomial approximation of a standard normal distribution as suggested by Zogheib and 
Hlynka (2009).
28.  The figure plots the loan funding time ratio with “zero per capita income” country being used as a reference. 
Also see footnote 19.
29.  Using the AIC information criterion (see table 1 in the appendix).
30.  Order effects are also discussed in Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg (2008).
31.  See Machery and Stich (in press), Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012), and Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner, 
and Alexander (2010).
32.  Other empirical work also suggests that people endorse a threshold (Brock, 2005).
33.  Miller (1999) considers several principles for distributing according to need in Principles of Social Justice, and 
one might expect some utilitarians, prioritarians, and sufficiency theorists to accept distribution insensitive, 
prioritarian, and threshold principles for distribution respectively. At least this result poses a question to these 
theorists about why they do not endorse what seem to be the most straightforward applications of their theories 
(if they do not).
34.  For a brief review of early work on this topic by psychologists, see Miller (1999). Also see Brock (2005).
35.  Another concern regarding the analysis of duration data is censoring. The latter occurs when transitions are 
incompletely observed, that is, when transitions take place either before (left-censoring), between (interval-
censoring), or after the dates when data are collected (right-censoring). For instance, in the case of Kiva lending, 
we might have had right-censored observations if there were loans in the dataset not yet fully funded by the time 
data were gathered. Alternatively, left-censoring could have taken place had we had data on loans posted on the 
Kiva website prior to the starting date of the sample period. Failure to account for such censorings can result in 
biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters. However, the censoring is of no concern to our analysis since 
the Kiva data available to us are for complete transitions only. In other words, the data set includes only those 
loans that were posted and subsequently funded within the sample period (from 04/17/2006 to 02/19/2008).
36.  The reason why these duration data models are formulated in terms of hazard rates (and thus referred to as 
hazard models) is both historical and technical. For a brief review, see Kiefer (1988).
37.  The two most popular ways to analyze the results are by looking either at predicted hazard rates or at predicted 
duration. An example of when it is of interest to look at the hazard rates is in studies of unemployment. Economists 
may be interested in looking at how the probability of finding a job and, thus, leaving the “unemployed” state, 
changes with an individual’s personal characteristics. Alternatively, one may analyze effectiveness of public 
programs for the unemployed by looking at whether they significantly affect participants’ probability of finding 
a job. In this paper, we take another route and analyze the data by looking at the predicted duration and 
investigating how the latter changes with the per capita income.
38.  Unlike in a traditional linear model like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), hazard models specify the conditional 
mean of the left-hand side variable as a non-linear function of the parameters. Particularly in the case of our 
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study, under the hazard model specification, we assume that exp (훽1 + 훽2y) ⋅ 휖, where all the variables (t, y, and 
ϵ) and parameters (β’s) are as defined earlier.
39.  If f (ti) stands for the probability of the loan funding time taking the value of the ith observation in our sample, then 
the joint probability of observing the whole data sample (of N i.i.d. observations) is the product of N individual 
probabilities, that is, f (t1) ⋅ f (t2) ⋅ f (t3)⋯ f (tN ). Taking a natural logarithm of this joint probability gives you a 
sum of logarithms of individual probabilities: ln[f (t1)] + ln[f (t2)] + ln[f (t3)] +⋯ + ln[f (tN )]. Having specified 
t = exp (훽1 + 훽2y ⋅ 휖), this sum of log-probabilities is referred to as the log-likelihood function, where β’s are treated 
as the unknown arguments. Maximizing the function in these unknown parameters gives the estimates of β’s 
that maximize the probability (likelihood) of observing the actual data sample. For an overview of the Maximum 
Likelihood estimation, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
40.  This is because the exponential distribution is a special case of the Weibull distribution. That is, the Weibull 
distribution is identical to the exponential distribution if its shape parameter is equal to unity.
41.  The degrees of freedom are the number of data points left free to vary after the estimation of a model. In other 
words, if k is the number of the estimated parameters and N is the total number of the observations contained 
in the data sample, then it is said that a model has (N – k) degrees of freedom, that is, a model is estimated using 
(N – k) independent data points.
42.  The fact that there is reason to accept the log-logistic model over its alternatives also gives us reason to believe 
that the duration dependence for the Kiva loans is non-monotonic and follows an inverted U-shape pattern. 
In other words, the conditional probability of getting a loan fully funded increases in the first few hours after 
the project has been posted on the Kiva website as more and more people get to browse it. However, if it is still 
not funded within the first few hours, the conditional probability of getting the loan funded starts to decrease.
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